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Regulation od damages in the field of competition law in Czech and French law with regard to European regulation
Štancl, Michal ; Horáček, Vít (advisor) ; Eichlerová, Kateřina (referee)
(English) Regulation of damages in the field of competition law in Czech and French law with regard to European regulation The purpose of this thesis is to analyze particular elements of actions for damages for infringements of the competition law, mainly those, which are contained in the Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union. Given that a directive is source of law sui generis that needs to be transposed into national legislations, it seems convenient to attempt to illustrate its effects on particular national legislations. The paper deals with actual states of legislation in the Czech republic and in France and attempts firstly to discover existing elements of the legislation and secondly on the other hand to indicate some missing or problematic parts. The thesis is, besides introduction and conclusion, composed of five main chapters. Chapter two observes the conception and evolution of the competition law in the European Union and particularly the origin of thoughts about private enforcement of the competition law. Chapter three focuses on the case law of Court of justice of the European Union that is...
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Leniency programmes and private enforcement of corporate group law in the EU
Kocí, Miloš ; Zemánek, Jiří (advisor) ; Šmejkal, Václav (referee)
The relationship between private and public enforcement of cartel law has been heavily discussed in the recent years, both in legal doctrine and political circles. The European Commission has come up with various initiatives in order to promote and support changes in the legal orders of the EU Member States, which would make the private enforcement of cartel law easier and more accessible, especially for consumers, but for other subjects impaired by the violation of competition rules as well. However, this effort needs to be balanced with the existing system of public enforcement, notably with the established and well-funcioning leniency programmes. A strenghtened "private pillar" must not cause any damage to the exisitng "public pillar". Can private enforcement be an efficient complement to the hitherto system (predominantly public), and if so, where are the limits of it? On one hand, the support of private enforcement could discourage cartelists to participate in the leniency programmes, because the possible economic benefits (exemption from fines) might not outweigh the losses (huge amounts paid on damages in connection with follow-on actions). On the other hand, it has been argued that private enforcement is deeply underdeveloped in the European Union and no ideas of the European Commission drawing...
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